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Introduction 
 
 A continuing question in the study of conflict and conflict management is, “When is 
conflict helpful, and when is it harmful?”  Though many have offered explanations for this (Jehn, 
Northcraft, & Neale, 1999), data in support of these notions have been less forthcoming, 
especially in relation to the helpfulness of conflict (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). In this paper we 
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present a dynamic model of conflict that we hope will both explain and clarify the confusion by 
conceptualizing conflict as simultaneously containing helpful (learning related) and harmful 
(negative sentiment related) components. We argue how both learning and negative emotion can 
inhibit or promote future conflict, constituting feedback loops. We then examine what this 
implies for conflict over time in terms of the efficacy of collaboration between parties who 
experience conflict.  
 Traditionally “helpful” conflict has been called task conflict or cognitive conflict, while 
the “harmful” type of conflict is relationship or emotional conflict (Amason, 1996; Amason & 
Sapienza, 1997; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001)1. Task conflict is centered on the 
group’s objectives, or what it should do to solve a problem. It can be animated, but it is not 
personal. Relationship conflict is personal and emotional and tends to be about clashes of the 
members of the group. While there has been much research on task (Amason et al., 1997; Cosier 
& Rose, 1977; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996) and relationship (Brewer, 1995, 
1996; Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998) conflict, what has failed to emerge is a clear picture of 
when or what type of conflict is functional or dysfunctional. Task conflict, theorized to be 
positive (Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Jehn, 1995, 1997) is found to be negative (De Dreu et al., 2003). 
Relationship conflict is seen as always negative, but in other fields that deal with the stability of 
continuing relationships, relationship conflict can sometimes be helpful. In the field of marital 
counseling, volatile couples who value honest expression of anger, and who also tend to engage 
in escalating quarrels, tended to be more stable than those who did not (Gottman, 1993). We 
believe that this confusion about the usefulness of conflict types comes from limitations imposed 
by the constructs themselves. 
                                                 
1 We use task and relationship conflict for convenience, but we mean task conflict to include cognitive conflict, and 
relationship conflict to include emotional conflict. These definitions are functionally equivalent in the papers we 
cite. 
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What we argue is that claiming conflict will either be task or relationship conflict has 
limited our understanding of conflict in general. First, it sets up a false dichotomy. Logically, 
there is no reason to claim that conflict could not be over both the task and the people; that is, 
that a person challenges the ideas of others, partially because of interpersonal feelings and 
partially because they think the idea is bad. Similarly, conflict over a task could not be 
interpreted as a personal attack, and therefore engender the same negative feelings. This is, in 
fact, what happens when task turns to relationship conflict (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997), but also 
can happen in a single instance when one is using a technique such as devil’s advocacy to merely 
explore further the nature of an idea (Schweiger, 1989; Schwenk, 1990).  This problem is why 
Torrance (1957) originally questioned whether people could meaningfully distinguish conflict 
about the task and the person.  
A more subtle potential problem with the use of task and relationship conflict is that they 
are treated as helpful or harmful in and of themselves, when even in the research on task and 
relationship conflict (e.g., Jehn et al., 1999) it is the learning that task conflict brings that is 
helpful (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995), and the bad feelings that relationship conflict creates that is 
harmful (Jehn et al., 2001). By learning, we mean the synthesis of task relevant information that 
the parties may have previously overlooked. “Negative feelings” is a general term we will use to 
describe a range of affective reactions from basic emotions (e.g., anger) to more complicated 
ones (e.g., apprehension), all of which are unpleasant to experience. We believe that if learning is 
the good and negative feelings are the bad outcomes of conflict, then we should examine how 
these arise from conflict directly. To do this we need to understand the interplay of the 
information and unpleasantness that can produce learning and negative feelings. 
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For these reasons, we start with the argument that disagreement over the task and 
personality clashes can and often do co-occur in the same disagreement. This implies that a 
single instance of conflict will generate some learning and some negative feelings as by products 
of the conflict. We think that it is important to understand the effect of these by products as they 
accumulate over time. Conflict is a dynamic process where subsequent actions are viewed in 
relation to what has already happened (Jehn et al., 2001; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 
1999). To this point, we believe that as the learning/ negative emotional by products of conflict 
accumulate, it can affect amount and usefulness of subsequent conflict. By examining the way 
learning and negative feelings result from conflict directly, and by taking into consideration 
conflicts that have occurred in the past, we believe we will be able to gain a clearer picture of the 
conditions under which conflict will be useful. 
In this paper, we begin by defining a conflict event, a single disagreement that can be 
bound in terms of time and space, in which task and relationship conflict can occur 
simultaneously. We go on to explain how a single conflict event can lead to learning and 
negative feelings simultaneously. We then suggest that learning and frustration will both affect 
the likelihood of subsequent conflict.  Finally, we complete our model by examining how 
negative feelings can affect subsequent learning, and vice versa. The model is presented in figure 
1. Once we have articulated the model, we describe what this implies for relationships over time 
(e.g., partners or groups), and demonstrate this using a computer simulation. We conclude by 
discussing the implications of our model for the study of conflict as well as conflict management. 
The conflict event 
 We define a conflict event as a disagreement between two or more parties, acknowledged 
by those involved, which can be bound in terms of time. Bound in terms of time means that the 
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experience of the conflict has a definable starting and stopping point (e.g., part of a meeting, a 
phone call, etc.). Acknowledged by those involved means that the parties to the conflict event all 
recognize that there is a disagreement and that some accommodation will need to take place 
before an agreement can be reached. Thus, an example of a conflict event would be a fight 
between a subordinate and boss that begins when the subordinate disputes the current bonus 
structure for employees in a meeting, and ends with the subordinate storming out.  
 Since a conflict event is not bound in terms of content (i.e., what it is about), we can 
allow a conflict event to contain some portion of task and some portion of relationship conflict. 
This conflict can also vary in the degree to which it is emotional. Our notion of a conflict event 
fit with Baron’s (1984) observation that “what starts as a rational exchange of opposing views 
deteriorates into an emotion laden interchange…in which strong negative feelings are aroused” 
(p 272). In this example, task information was exchanged, negative feelings were aroused, and 
personal attacks may have surfaced as well, and this was experienced as a single conflict event. 
We define a conflict event thusly because we believe it will correspond more to people’s 
experience of conflict. By admitting the possibility that both task and relationship elements are 
present in a conflict, as well as varying levels of emotion, we can use these as the basis from 
which to deduce what the effects of a conflict event will be. 
The by-products of conflict events 
 If we accept that a conflict event can be about the task and about relationships, from this 
we can derive the by-products of conflict. Task conflict can produce information as people try to 
reconcile their diverse perspectives about how a decision should be made or a problem should be 
solved (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997). We would also argue that useful information can come from 
non-task arguments such as procedures or interpersonal interactions. Here, the same mechanism 
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is at work, different perspectives about the processes or people lead others to disclose 
information that was previously being overlooked by the other parties, and the incorporation of 
that information should improve the way the parties interact. For example, disagreement over 
whether one was trying to marginalize another can bring to light information on how people wish 
to be treated in a group. When this is incorporated into the group’s interaction patterns, it should 
improve the groups functioning. 
Relationship conflict will produce some amount of unpleasant feelings in those involved 
(Amason et al., 1997; Jehn, 1997), as people do not like being personally attacked. Yet conflict 
may be unpleasant for reasons other than personal attack. Some people may not wish to argue 
over something they deeply believe should be true. Such a conflict over values may provoke a 
person’s sense of morality over the way they believe things ought to be (such as fairness 
judgments, see Bies, 1987) or may even be threatening to the ego (Allred, 1999). Finally, some 
people simply do not like confrontation and are conflict avoidant. This individual parameter 
implies that engaging in a conflict event of any sort will evoke some degree of unpleasantness.  
A conflict event can thus be located on a 2 dimensional plan where there is some amount 
of task relevant information, and some amount of unpleasantness (figure 2). In this depiction, the 
lower right (high information, low unpleasantness) is where task conflict is usually positioned, 
and the upper left (low information, high unpleasantness) is where relationship conflict is usually 
positioned. Our notion of the conflict event also admits low information, low unpleasantness 
conflict, as well as high information, high unpleasantness conflict. Across all types, we postulate 
that the information and unpleasantness that surface during the conflict will produce two by-
products, learning and negative feelings. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 here 
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------------------------------------------- 
 The Conflict-Learning Loop. We argue that conflict brings about information, leading to 
learning, and as people learn about each other (and the task), they will be better able to work 
together productively, thereby decreasing the amount of future conflict. Consider how conflict 
can lead to learning. The information surfaced by conflict, if properly synthesized, should lead to 
learning (Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Tjosvold, 1985, 1997). Learning between people is 
"the activities through which individuals acquire, share and combine knowledge through 
experience with one another" (Argote, Gruenfeld, & Naquin, 2001, p. 370). Thus as parties share 
their own perspectives and information, it can expand or deepen the capabilities of others, 
leading to more adaptive responses. Learning does not have to only be about better ways to do 
the task. Parties could learn better ways to interact or communicate with each other, or better 
ways to resolve conflicts or make decisions. When people learn better ways to interact or work, 
in addition to improving the output of the group, it can have a secondary effect of reducing 
conflict. 
One way learning should decrease the probability of future conflict is by reducing 
misunderstanding between the parties. Misunderstanding can lead to conflict when 
communication is misconstrued, and people react to their misunderstanding as though it were the 
intended meaning. For example, if person A, intending only to get more clarity, questions person 
B’s motives for a decision, person B may misconstrue this question to be a personal attack. 
Person B may react and the respond in kind with a personal attack on person A, starting a 
conflict spiral (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998). As parties learn about each other, it should reduce 
the number of times people make these sorts of errors. The meaning of ideas can be 
misconstrued as well. For instance if an engineer says “design a quality (meaning durable) part” 
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to a designer, who takes quality to mean finely crafted, conflict can arise after the two realize 
they were expecting different objects. As people learn about each other, it becomes easier for 
them to understand the nuance of their language, and to anticipate, prepare for, and 
accommodate each other’s needs. This should also decrease conflict that comes from people 
acting in unexpected or undesired ways. 
 The Conflict-Negative Feelings Loop. We argue that conflict, in addition to bringing 
about information, is going to be experienced as somewhat unpleasant, and that this will lead to a 
buildup in negative feelings that over time can prime people for more conflict. The first link in 
this is that when people experience the unpleasantness of conflict, it can build up negative 
feelings. The most familiar example of this is what happens in relationship conflict where 
people’s personalities are attacked. This is an unpleasant experience that can evoke anger, 
irritation or annoyance (Amason, 1996; Amason et al., 1997; Pelled, 1996). Yet we argue that 
there may be other negative feelings that build as the result of conflict. When resolution to a 
conflict is delayed by protracted difficulties, this can be a frustrating experience. Here it is the 
inability to get to a resolution rather than anything personal that evokes the unpleasantness, and 
the particular feeling is one of frustration. In the case of a less powerful person trying to resolve 
an important issue (e.g., a small business owner trying to fight a mistaken IRS decision), it may 
be despair rather than frustration that emerges. Finally, some negative feelings may be individual 
based. A person who simply is conflict avoidant may just experience displeasure as he or she is 
engaged in the conflict, even a relatively mild one. A person in a high status position may feel 
affronted that he or she is challenged by a lower status one. Across situations, people, and 
conflict types the mix of specific negative feelings may change, but in all cases the conflict itself 
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is experienced as unpleasant to some degree, and leaves an emotional residue of feelings that are 
on the negative side of the continuum.  
When negative feelings build up, it should increase the likelihood of conflict. There are a 
number of ways in which negative feelings can provoke conflict. A very simple one is 
frustration-aggression (Berkowitz, 1982), when people are frustrated they can lash out. 
Frustration has been shown to perpetuate the conflict cycle (De Dreu, Nauta, & van de Vliert, 
1995). Another is reciprocity, where people who are experiencing something unpleasant can seek 
to return the unpleasantness in kind, especially if they feel justified (Bies, 1987). Negative 
feelings may prime people to look for conflict as well. When people are in a negative mood they 
are more likely to attend to or remember similarly valenced thoughts (Bower & Forgas, 2001). 
Through these different mechanisms, as the amount of negative feelings build, the likelihood of 
conflict should increase as well. 
Feedback between the loops - The tipping point 
 If conflict simultaneously increased learning and negative feelings, assuming fairly 
similar rates of conflict increasing (through negative feelings) and decreasing (through learning), 
it would simply mean that over time you would have a very skilled and surly group. It would do 
little to explain why task conflict appears to be mostly ineffective (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), 
and it would imply that conflict would have about the same effect no matter what had happened 
before. However, we argue that there is also a feedback loop between learning and negative 
feelings, such that negative feelings can reduce learning, and learning can reduce negative 
feelings (for evidence of the simultaneity of this relationship in a particular context see, Holman 
& Wall, 2002) . This will mean that over time, there is a high likelihood that one loop (learning 
or negative feelings) will tend to dominate the other. 
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 Negative feelings reduce learning. In order for people to learn from the information 
given, they must have the capacity and motivation to do so. This is because synthesizing 
information into ones own knowledge base is an effortful process (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). When 
something decreases cognitive capacity, then less of this type of learning can take place. 
Negative emotions can do just that; negative emotions crowds out cognitive capacity for other 
learning (Bless & Schwarz, 1999). At the same time, emotion can lead one to either selectively 
attend or encode particular (Forgas, 1995) details, thus not comprehending the full story, but 
only the affect congruent parts (which would be negative). 
 In addition to reducing capacity to learn, we argue that negative feelings, especially those 
centered on others, will reduce the motivation to learn from them. Here instead of not being able 
to process the information given, people will choose not to. This kind of dismissal is more akin 
to prejudice (Devine, 1989). It uses surface features to dismiss the usefulness of information 
before it is processed. The end result is the same, information that would be useful is not 
incorporated into a persons thinking.  
 Learning reduces negative feelings. As people work through their difficulties, it can 
counter some of the negative feelings that have built up. At a fundamental level, we argue that 
each “breakthrough” that results from learning should have some degree of satisfaction (or relief) 
associated with it. This would operate through the same reinforcement mechanisms used to 
design self directed learning programs, where people’s interest and commitment grows through a 
series of small successes learning a task (Keller, 1968). When the learning also results in the 
overcoming of small disagreements, we expect this to mollify negative feelings as well. Here the 
same principles that work for the gradual reduction in tension strategy (Osgood, 1974), where 
small concessions help overcome frustration and bolster commitment to a course of action or at 
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least promote positive attributions to counter the negative feelings (Lindskold, 1978), would 
operate. In short, as people learn about others, it can produce a sense of accomplishment 
(especially when the learning solves actual problems) and the positive feelings that this 
accomplishment evokes can reduce the negative feelings brought about by the unpleasantness of 
conflict.   
Conflict over time 
 Now let us consider the behavior of the entire system over time. With each conflict event, 
there is some increase in learning, and some increase in negative feelings. For simplicity, we will 
imagine that frustration subsides and learning decays at similar rates (this does not change the 
main point of the model). In this system, each loop has the possibility to dominate the other. If 
there are more negative feelings than learning, then the information brought about by the conflict 
event will go unused as people will not learn from each other. This effectively leaves frustration 
and conflict to spiral unabated as there is no learning to “put the brakes” on the conflict-negative 
feelings loop. On the other hand, if learning outstrips negative emotion, there will be less 
conflict, and the unpleasantness of whatever conflict comes up should be overshadowed by the 
learning that takes place. Thus there are fewer chances for conflict to produce unpleasantness, 
and the buildup of negative feelings will be diminished. Over time, this model predicts one of 
three outcomes. 
 Outcome 1: Too much negative feelings – group disintegration. In this scenario, learning 
happens at a lower rate than the accumulation of negative feelings, and so the frustration 
feedback loop overtakes the learning feedback loop. Thus each conflict event feeds the level of 
negative feelings, further diminishing learning while begetting more conflict. After a certain 
point this group will disintegrate. The level of negative feeling in people will become so 
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unpleasant that no one will want to continue in the group, as at a certain level people will begin 
to withdraw (Spector & Storms, 1987). Since learning will have long since stopped, there will 
little reason (in terms of effectiveness) to try to save the group. 
 Outcome 2: Too much learning – groupthink. Some groups will seek to minimize all 
conflict and negative feelings. This kind of overzealous desire to have group harmony can be 
accomplished by inculcating people into the same way of thinking. In this scenario, any conflict 
would be an occasion for people to learn how to react to each other so that they avoid conflict in 
the future. The outcome here is groupthink (Janis, 1997). As everyone is taught to thing the same 
way, negative feelings are avoided but at the high cost of narrowing the group’s range of 
thinking. We caution here that what can happen can be insidious, that people can focus on 
commonality to the exclusion of anything that might cause conflict. An example is people’s 
tendency to focus on shared information (Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). As people learn from 
each other and about each other, there can be a homogenizing force that simply crowds out 
conflict (and by extension frustration). You then get the “happy and ineffective” group that 
would rather compromise than find a Pareto-optimal solution. 
 Outcome 3: The right balance – cohesion and resilience. In our minds, the optimal 
situation is where the learning occurs at a high enough rate to control but not eliminate 
frustration. This steady state behavior implies that conflicts still occur, and that they are 
somewhat difficult to solve (guaranteeing some frustration but also learning when it is solved). 
We see this as analogous to the suggestion that for maximal improvement, one should have goals 
slightly beyond one’s reach (Locke & Latham, 2002). Like “slightly beyond”, “somewhat 
difficult” needs further research to quantify. We can say, however that if the learning in which a 
group engages expands the members views (as opposed to refining the current shared view), it 
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should be less likely to descend into groupthink, as pushing these boundaries will create more 
questions than answers. At the same time, as the group continues to try and keep their 
perspectives integrated, provided the synthesis of ideas is not too disparate, the frustration 
created should never rise to that critical detrimental point where learning is choked off by high 
amounts of negative feelings. Learning advances at a rate high enough to keep the level down. 
A simulation of this model 
 [The model proposed in this paper can be emulated using systems dynamics. We 
plan to create a model in Vensim where we can compare different parameters (rates of 
learning, negative feeling buildup, etc.) and demonstrate the three outcomes as a function 
of these different parameters. This is still in development] 
Implications  
 Our model expands on the notions of conflict as a dynamic process. The notion that what 
happens in conflict depends on what has happened previously is found in the research on conflict 
spirals (Brett et al., 1998) and on offer-type reciprocity (Weingart et al., 1999). These processes 
occur within single conflict events. Our model expands the general notions to what happens 
between conflict events. In a different vein, Jehn and Chatman (2000) have looked at conflict 
dynamics by viewing the effects of relationship and task conflict as a function of the proportion 
of each type of conflict over a period of time (i.e., multiple conflict events). Our model looks at 
this notion within single conflict events (also looking not at task conflict and relationship conflict 
directly, but rather their by-products). We hope our theory will contribute to the understanding of 
conflict in relation to the history of conflict between parties.  
Our model can explain one of the current paradoxes in conflict research, why task 
conflict does not produce constructive controversy and in fact is most often negative (De Dreu et 
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al., 2003). We have argued that the information imparted by task conflict can be ignored if 
frustration is high. Thus the simultaneous presence of a high level of negative feelings would 
effectively negate the usefulness of any task relevant information shared. This intuition is 
consistent with the finding that trust can help increase the usefulness of task conflict (Simons & 
Peterson, 2000), as trust should reduce the unpleasantness of conflict  (e.g., people who trust 
each other may not make negative attributions about the conflict).  
Future research 
 We see multiple research opportunities in testing the parts of the model we have 
presented, as well as to improve the model overall. Although some links are well established 
(information improves learning), others are not (negative feelings prevent learning). One could 
also try to determine the limits of interdependence between the two loops in the model (e.g., how 
much negative feeling can be tolerated before learning is affected). One can also think about 
exogenous influences on these processes. One mentioned earlier was trust, which we would 
expect would moderate the link between conflict and negative emotion, but may actually work to 
decrease misunderstanding (people would be less likely to make negative attributions about the 
motives of those they trusted).  
 At a more general theoretical level we thing our model has implications worth pursuing 
with regard to the endpoints of protracted conflict. Intuitively, it seems like the conflict-negative 
emotional loop would be most likely to group out of control. We would conjecture that 
unpleasantness is more consistent than learning. If that is so, then figuring out how to control that 
feedback loop seems critical. Here we would argue that most people concentrate on decreasing 
the unpleasantness of conflict (Robinson & Weldon, 1993). Maybe researchers should try to 
figure out how to dissipate the negative feeling buildup as well. 
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At the practical level, research needs to be done on how to find the balance between 
learning and frustration. Are there “warning signs” that can redirect a group when it gets too high 
on either frustration or learning? A better question may be simply what controls to put in place to 
manage the level of frustration. In this paper we have suggested learning as the countervailing 
force, but there are clearly variables exogenous to the model that should help. Is an established 
relationship where people are committed enough to each other to “weather the storm”. Maybe 
hoping to increase learning as a means to reduce frustration is too uncertain a bet, and other 
relational factors (trust, respect) can be used instead.  
Our model raises many questions. We hope it serves to untangle some of the confusion 
currently existing in the study of conflict, as well as to promote research on conflict as it is 
experienced over time. 
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Figure 1. Conflict events can be located on this Cartesian plane 
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Figure 2. The dynamic model of conflict, learning, and frustration 
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